Nuclear power plants are some of the most sophisticated and complex energy systems ever designed. These systems perform safety critical functions and must conform to national safety institutions and international regulations. In many cases, regulatory documents provide very high level and ambiguous requirements that leave a large margin for interpretation. As the French nuclear industry is now seeking to spread its activities outside France, it is but necessary to master the ins and the outs of the variability between countries safety culture and regulations. This sets both an industrial and a scientific challenge to introduce and propose a product line engineering approach to an unaware industry whose safety culture is made of interpretations, specificities, and exceptions.
INTRODUCTION
Nuclear power plants are some of the most sophisticated and complex energy systems ever designed. Nuclear safety Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from Permissions@acm.org. covers the actions taken to prevent nuclear and radiation accidents or to limit their consequences. This covers nuclear power plants and, more particularly, their instrumentation and control systems (I&C), which have been using more and more digital devices since the middle of the 1980's. Countries utilizing nuclear power have special institutions overseeing and regulating nuclear safety. Nuclear industry projects must comply with regulatory safety requirements and recommendations that are expressed in large and heterogeneous documents: legal texts, international standards or even regulatory specific positions.
Due to the lack of international consensus on regulatory practices [17] , the willingness to build such systems in different countries requires to face practices of several safety authorities and can challenge the initial system design [13] . Therefore, it is necessary for our industrial partners to find similarities in regulations in order to minimize the basic design e↵orts and its qualification. The French nuclear industry and academic partners have joined forces in the CON-NEXION project to develop the major innovations in the design and implementation of the future nuclear power plants' I&C systems. One aspect of the project consists in the formalization, from a general and high level perspective, of both requirements and architecture elements variabilities.
Introducing a software product line engineering approach in this domain, which has a long history of exceptions and individualities, sets both scientific and industrial challenges. (Q1) How to introduce variability modeling to nuclear engineers? (Q2) What is the best variability modeling paradigm, accordingly to the domain practices? (Q3) How to deal with the search space in regulatory corpora and what is the right granularity level for modeling variability in requirements? (Q4) How to bind a requirements variability model and an architecture variability model in order to derive an architecture that conforms to a requirements configuration?
In this paper, we address in particular the retrieval of a variability model from regulatory requirements and its mapping to an architecture developed by a Nuclear consortium. The contribution of the papers are: 1. an approach to model variability in regulatory requirements, capture architectural variability and investigate the robustness of the architecture against requirements variability; 2. an illustration of the approach and tooling support on a realistic use case we have conducted with industrial partners; 3. lessons learned about the introduction of variability in this particular domain as well as upcoming challenges.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce a quick picture of the current nu-clear regulatory requirements landscape and discuss the lack of variability awareness of the nuclear industry. Section 3 presents research background. Section 4 gives an overview of the proposed approach. Sections 5 and 6 describe the overall variability approach. Section 7 describes the di↵erent techniques used to implement our method and their applications in the context of the CONNEXION project. Section 8 presents related work while Section 9 concludes the paper and describes future work.
INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the context of our research work (the CONNEXION project) as well as industrial and academic challenges.
The CONNEXION Project
Since 2011, the CONNEXION 1 project is a national work program to prepare the design and implementation of the next generation of I&C systems for nuclear power plants, with an international compliance dimension. The CON-NEXION project is built around a set of academic partners (CEA, INRIA, CNRS / CRAN, ENS Cachan, LIG, Telecom ParisTech) and on collaborations between large integrators such as AREVA and ALSTOM, EDF and "technology providers" of embedded software (Atos Worldgrid, Rolls-Royce Civil Nuclear, Corys TESS, Esterel Technologies, All4Tec, Predict).
For the specific concern of having a high level and global perspective on requirements and architecture variability modeling, the working group started on November 2013 and was constituted of CEA, Inria, AREVA, EDF, Atos Worldgrid, Rolls-Royce Civil Nuclear, and All4Tec engineers and researchers. The group size varies from 3 to 14 persons depending of the individual or collective task to perform. In the group, Inria and All4Tec are considered as variability experts while the rest of the participants have neither academic nor industrial variability culture. Between November 2013 and April 2014, the group has organized a dozen of half-day to full day workshops as well as several regular or ad hoc telephone meetings, which ensures a high level of interactivity.
On the Regulation Heterogeneity and Variability
Safety critical systems must comply with their requirements, where regulatory requirements are first class citizens. These requirements are from various natures, from regulations expressed by national and international bodies, to national explicit or implicit guidance or national practices. They also come from national and international standards when they are imposed by a specific regulator [19] .
In the specific context of nuclear energy, one applicant has to deal with very heterogeneous regulations and practices, varying from one country to another. This heterogeneity has a huge impact in the certification process as the regulators safety expectations, evidences and justification to provide can vary [18, 7] .
At this level, the main concern comes from the di↵erence between national practices and the set of documents (regulatory texts ans standards) to comply with. The nuclear industry has an unstable and growing set of safety standards. Worse, the set of safety standards is increasing within two main standards areas. On the one hand, there are the IEEE/ISO standards that are mainly applied in the US and eastern Asia. On the other hand, the IAEA/IEC standards and recommendations followed in Europe 2 . This heterogeneity and lack of harmonization of the di↵erent nuclear safety practices has been highlighted by the Western Europe Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA)in 2006 [17] .
Proposing one system, when having to perform a safety function, in di↵erent countries then leads to a huge problem of variability that concerns, not only the set of requirements to comply with and the certification process, but also the system's architecture itself.
Lack of Product Line Culture
Rise and Fall of the EPR Reactor Out of France. In France, EDF owns and operates 58 nuclear power units, following four di↵erent designs or series (same design but specific projects). Born from a European program, the Evolutionary Pressurized Reactor (EPR) design represents the new power plant generation and has been expected to be built on several countries: France, Finland, the UnitedKingdom, China, and later, in the USA. The British safety authorities reference the same set of IEC standards as in France. However, their acceptable practices di↵er on some significant points. US authorities provide detailed written regulatory requirements and guidance but endorse but IEEE documents.
As a consequence, the concept of series that enabled to design and maintain the nuclear power plants in France can no longer be applied as such for export. Thus, since 2008, in the five most advanced EPR projects (construction in Finland, France and China, certification in progress in the USA and UK), EDF and Areva have been with four di↵erent I&C architectures and five di↵erent and ad hoc certification processes, specific to each country.
Conforming to Di↵erent Regulations. Comparing each IEC standard (and their interpretations) with its approximately relevant IEEE corresponding standard is dicult, time consuming and does not ensure to have the correct interpretation of the di↵erent standards. Though the domain owns a very precise and established vocabulary, ambiguities [16] and interpretations are legions. Legal documents and standards contain intended and unintended ambiguity [2, 12] , causing interpretations, misunderstandings and negotiations between stakeholders. Scope of regulations may also di↵er as there is no direct mapping from one standard to another but many overlaps and di↵erences.
Though the task is very di cult, formalizing the requirements variability and finding the common core that will enable the next I&C architecture generation is more than necessary from the industrial perspective. In the context of the CONNEXION Project, a product line approach consists to define a generic foundation that is refined for a given project by taking into account the specific requirements. This is an important challenge for building I&C systems on EPR units or other types of reactors in several countries in order to avoid the questioning of the initial design principles.
RESEARCH BACKGROUND
The Common Variability Language (CVL) [5] is a domainindependent language for specifying and resolving variability. We present here the three pillars of CVL and introduce some terminology that will be used in our approach.
Variability Abstraction Model (VAM ) expresses the variability in terms of a tree-based structure. Inspired by feature and decision modeling approaches [6] , the main concepts of the VAM are the variability specifications, called VSpecs. CVL distinguishes three types of VSpecs, essentially linked to their types: choice (Boolean), variable (other primitive types) and classifier (multiple instanciations).
Base Models (BMs) is a set of models, each conforming to a domain-specific modeling language (DSML). The conformance of a model to a modeling language depends both on well-formedness rules (syntactic rules) and business, domain-specific rules (semantic rules). The Object Constraint Language (OCL) is typically used for specifying the static semantics. In CVL, a base model plays the role of an asset in the classical sense of SPL engineering. These models are then customized to derive a complete product.
Variability Realization Model (VRM ) contains a set of Variation Points (VP). They specify how VSpecs (i.e., Choices) are realized in the base model(s). An SPL designer defines in the VRM what elements of the base models are removed, added, substituted, modified (or a combination of these operations) given a selection or a deselection of a choice in the VAM. Fig. 1 depicts the approach we developed to tackle the variability issues. The long term goal is to configure a robust I&C architecture from features related to regulatory requirements. The gap between textual regulatory requirements and the architecture is obviously important and variability cross-cuts both parts. Therefore the key idea is to exploit architectural design rules as an intermediate between the regulatory requirements and the architecture.
OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH
Intensive interactions between all the involving partners and numerous workshops and meetings lead to the adoption of the approach (see also Section 7.3 for more details). Two separate areas of variabilities are part of the approach (1) variability among requirements (the main focus of the paper) led by Inria and (2) variability among the architecture led by another partner.
Regarding the requirements variability, it can take place at two levels: the variability of one particular requirement and the variability of a set of requirements within a product line.
A first key task is to determine the variabilities within the set of requirements we want to satisfy. At the same time, the other key task is related to the adaptation of these variable elements by orchestrating the possible configurations from the architecture perspective.
The first stage aims at handling the multiple interpretations of ambiguous regulations using mining techniques. The second stage addresses the impact of requirements variability on the architecture and its certification through the variability in design rules. In Section 5, we address more precisely the mining and modeling of variability in nuclear standards. In Section 6, we describe how we model variability of design rules and the brige between variability in both requirements and architecture.
HANDLING VARIABILITY IN REGULA-TORY REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we present how we manage variability with nuclear regulatory requirements and its modeling with the OMG Common Variability Language (CVL) [5] . This domain is complex because of the variety of documents one has to handle; the number of requirements they contain; their high level of abstraction and ambiguity, etc. We proposed to analyze variability in regulatory documents with the smaller scope of topics (A topic is a concern within a corpus (e.g., "independence", "safety Classification", etc.)), on di↵erent corpora and on the same abstraction level: regulatory text, regulatory guidance or standards (see Section 5.3).
Our industrial partners proposed to model variability in IEC and IEEE standards for each of these two topics: independence (see Table 1 ) and safety classification (see Table 2 ).
I&C Architecture Concepts. In order to ease the understanding of the following sections, we briefly describe the main concepts of a classic I&C architecture. An I&C architecture can be decomposed into systems that perform functions. Systems and functions are classified with respect to their safety importance. These systems and functions are organized within lines of defense (LDs) and many constraints drive the organization of the architecture in order to prevent common cause failures. These constraints mainly deal with communication or independence (physical separation and/or electrical isolation) between lines of defense or systems with respect to their safety classification.
Requirements Similarity Identification
The first step of Fig. 1 is based on the intuition that features are made of clusters of related requirements. In order to form these clusters, requirements are considered related if they concern similar matters. Thus, the subject matter of the requirements has to be compared, and requirements with similar subject matter will be grouped. For example, in Table 1 , the following safety requirements IEC 60709.1, IEC 60709.11, IEC 60709.12, IEEE 384.1 and IEEE 384.5 are similar because all of them are addressing the independence between systems. In particular, IEC 60709.1, IEC 60709.11 and IEC 60709.12 are dealing with preventing system degradation, while IEEE 384.1 and IEEE 384.5 specify how this must be achieved.
Feature Clustering
The feature clustering step creates a feature tree based on the similarity measures from the previous stage. Requirements which are semantically similar, i.e., have the most in common, are "clustered" to form a feature. These smaller features are then clustered with other features and requirements to form a parent feature. Table 3 reports the global traceability between identified features and standards requirements.
Modeling Regulatory Requirements Variability with CVL
We propose to illustrate the complexity of safety requirements corpus through the manual search of similar requirements dealing with similar matter. As a reminder, this requirements analysis will be made on three di↵erent corpora, France, UK and US and on two standards: IEC and IEEE for each of these two topics: independence (see Table 1 ) and safety classification (see Table 2 ). Fig. 2 shows an extract from the requirements model and its related variability model. Standards and regulatory texts concerns can be organized as variably concepts and properties like ICFunction, Independence between Systems (see Fig. 2 ), Independence between Functions and Communication Separation (see Fig. 3 ) which correspond to mandatory features.
In Fig. 2 , ICSystem and ICFunction are two classifiers having an instance multiplicity [1..*] (i.e., at least one instance of ICSystem and ICFunction must be created). Each ICSystem is associated with a Safety Class (See IEC 60964.11 in Table 2 ) and each ICFunction is associated with a Safety Category. Each ICFunction is allocated to at least one ICSystem while Safety Category must be lower or equal to Safety Class. See the OCL constraint attached to ICFunction and IEC 61513.3 in Table 2 .
There are two alternatives for Safety Class: IEC Class and IEEE Class form an Xor-group (i.e., at least and at most one feature must be selected). Similarly, IEC Category and IEEE Category form two alternatives of Safety Category. Independence between Redundant Parts, Independence between Systems of Di↵erent Classes and Prevent System Degradation are mandatory child features of Independence.Sys. On the other hand, in Fig. 3 , Independence between Functions of Di↵erent Categories is a mandatory child feature of Independence between Functions (See IEC 61226.18 in Table 2 ).
In a previous work, Sannier and Baudry [19] proposed a formalization of nuclear regulatory requirements into a requirements model using Domain specific languages (DSLs). We rely on this DSL in our work. Yet, it is worth noticing that instead of representing only requirements within a linear organization, they represent a corpus of di↵erent kinds of documents, which contains di↵erent kinds of fragments with di↵erent semantics. Fig. 2 depicts an excerpt of a standards BM that contains the minimal subset to formalize IEC 60709.1 requirement. From IEC 60709 standard, we present some transformation elements into text fragments and the traceability to requirements that are created and will be the analyzed elements. Moreover, this figure illustrates bindings between standards BM and the standards VAM. For instance, the "object existence" variation points against the IEC 60709.1 Section refer to the choice Independence.Sys, IEC Class and IEC Category meaning it will exist only when these choices are decided positively. The "object existence" variation point against the IEC 60709.1.b Standard Requirement is bound to the choice Independence between Systems of Di↵erent Classes.
MAPPING BETWEEN REQUIREMENTS
AND ARCHITECTURE
Modeling Variability in Design Rules
Design Rules to Bridge Requirements and Architecture Elements.
Modeling requirements variability is useful, however there is no direct mapping from requirements to the architecture. To brige the gap between textual regulatory requirements and the architecture, we move towards variability in design rules. Design rules, edited by EDF and endorsed by the French safety authority, are intermediate elements to bridge the gap between an architecture and the regulatory or normative requirements. Our industrial partners rely on these rules to validate the architecture against regulations. A design rule can satisfy fully or partially one or more requirements: in Table 1 SA10 (resp. SA54) completely satisfies IEC 60709.1 and IEC 60709.11 (resp. IEEE 384.1 and IEEE 384.5).
Identifying and Modeling Variability in Design Rules.
Similarly to requirements, the identification of features in deign rules consists in comparing the subject matter of rules followed by a clustering step. For instance, SA10, SA12 and SA54 are similar because they are dealing with the separation of systems of di↵erent classes. In particular, SA10 and SA12 deal with communication without perturbation between systems of di↵erent classes whereas SA54 forbids the communication between them (see Table 1 ). Table 3 reports the traceability between identified features and design rules.
Comparing design rules interpretations in the three countries leads to the variability specification in Fig. 4 . The concept of design rules are decomposed into the following mandatory features: ICFunction, Communication Separation in Fig. 3 and the two kinds of communication: Functions Communication (communication between functions) and Systems Communication (Communication between Systems). Similarly in standards VAM, each ICFunction is allocated to at least one ICSystem and only one Line of Defense.
France and UK allow the communication between systems of di↵erent classes only if it will not cause systems perturbation using isolation devices (see SA10 and SA12 in Table 1 ), however USA forbids it (see SA54 in Table 1 ). In Fig. 4 , Communication without Perturbation and No Communication between Systems of Di↵erent Classes are two alternatives for Separation between Systems of Di↵erent Classes. Moreover, decouplingType is an optional classifier of Systems Communication. The latter has an OCL constraint written in its context comparing the Sender Class and the Receiver Class. If a Sender Class is lower than its Receiver Class, it requires isolation: the function non Empty() is used to state that there is at least one instance of the decouplingType classifier. Where signals are extracted from category B or C systems for use in lower category systems, isolation devices may not be required; however, good engineering practices should be followed to prevent the propagation of faults.
SA12
A higher classified system can not directly send information to a lower classified system.
France and UK IEEE 384.1 Physical separation and electrical isolation shall be provided to maintain the independence of Class 1E circuits and equipment so that the safety functions required during and following any design basis event can be accomplished.
SA54
No communication between systems with di↵erent classes.
US IEEE 384.5 1) Non-Class 1E circuits shall be physically separated from Class 1E circuits and associated circuits by the minimum separation requirements specified in 6.1.3, 6.1.4, . . . 2) Non-Class 1E circuits shall be electrically isolated from Class 1E circuits and associated circuits by the use of isolation devices, shielding, and wiring techniques or separation distance. The design basis for information systems, including their measurement devices, shall take into account their importance to safety. The intended safety function of each system and its importance in enabling the operators to take proper pertinent actions . . .
SA5
Every system and sensor is associated with safety class.
US, France and UK IEC 61513 .3 d) Each IC system shall be classified according to its suitability to implement IC functions up to a defined category.
SA8
Function with safety category n can be allocated only on systems of safety classes n or >n.
US, France and UK IEC 61226. 18 There shall be adequate separation between the functions of di↵erent categories.
FA11
A lower classified function can not send information to a higher classified function.
US, France and UK IEC 61226.3a
An IC function shall be assigned to category C if it meets any of the following criteria and is not otherwise assigned to category A or category B: a) plant process control functions operating so that the main process variables are maintained within the limits assumed in the safety analysis not covered by 5.4.3 e).
SA57 SA58
The FA6 function associated category B. The FA5 function associated category A. The three countries forbid the communication from lower to higher classified functions (see FA11 in Table 2 ). An OCL constraint is attached to Functions Communication, requiring that the Sender Category must be higher or equal than Receiver Category. Furthermore, a function allocated to a line of defense shall not communicate with a function allocated to another line of defense. Consequently, a second OCL constraint, attached to Functions Communication is added.
France

Mapping Between the Standards VAM and the Design Rules VAM
Since design rules represent intermediate elements between the requirements and the architecture, the design rules VAM acts like a pivot between the standards VAM and the architecture variability model (VM). Fig. 3 depicts two extracts from both standards VAM and design rules VAM; and also the mapping between them. For instance, Separation between Systems of Di↵erent Classes in design rules VAM is related to Independence between Systems of Di↵er-ent Classes in standards VAM. This mapping is due to the fact that SA10 satisfies IEC 60709.1 and IEC 60709.11 and SA54 satifies IEEE 384.1 and IEEE 384.5, at the same time, SA10 and SA54 are related to Separation between Systems of Di↵erent Classes (see Table 3 right-hand side) while IEC 60709.1, IEC 60709.11, IEEE 384.1 and IEEE 384.5 refer to Independence between Systems of Di↵erent Classes (see Table 3 left-hand side). An architecture metamodel is defined by one partner: the CEA, based on the di↵erent elements that characterize an I&C system of a nuclear power plant through a SysML profile. CEA uses the SysML modeler Papyrus with the Sequoia add-on for managing I&C architecture product line (see Fig. 4c ). As mentioned earlier, industrial partners rely on design rules to validate the architecture against regulations. However, they do it for each derived architecture. Thus, we propose to consider both of the design rules VAM and the architecture VM during the derivation of a particular architecture. Fig. 4 illustrates, first the binding between the architecture product line model and the corresponding feature model and then, the impact of the design rules VAM on the derived architecture. For instance, if we select Communication Without Perturbation in Fig. 4b , then we allow the communication between systems of di↵erent safety classes. Yet, the communication from a lower classified system to a higher classified system requires isolation: decouplingType (see OCL constraint). As shown in this figure, System communication architecture block in the derived architecture contains the following links: 1. from higher to lower classified system :from SICS (Class 1) to DSS (Class 2). 2. from lower to higher classified system: from PICS (Class 3) to RCSL (Class 2) by isolation means. 3. between equal classified systems: from PS A (Class 1) to SICS.
Considering the two OCL constraints in Fig. 4a left-hand side, we forbid the communication between functions of different lines of defense or from lower to higher classified function. As a result, Functional communication architecture block in the derived architecture contains a link from Monitoring LCO(Category: C NCAQ and Line of Defense: L1) to Elaboration signal control C2 (Category: NC and Line of Defense: L1).
APPLICATION OF THE APPROACH
Implementation
As mentioned earlier, we use CVL language and tool support for modeling variability in requirements and design rules, while CEA address modeling variability in the architecture using Sequoia tool. The goal of the Sequoia approach [8] , developed by the CEA LIST is to help designers to build product lines based on UML/SysML models. Variability in Sequoia is defined through a UML profile [21] . To specify an optional element, the designer simply adds the stereotype VariableElement to the item. The stereotype ElementGroup introduces additional information through its properties, such as constraints between variable elements. In Sequoia, the decision model is used as a guide enabling to analyze all available variants and paths leading to a completely defined product. Once the derivation activity is launched, the choices described by the decision model are proposed to the user as a series of questions. The output of this process is a completely defined product and the user is not able to make any kind of modification to the initial model until the derivation step is over. Table 5 describes the main properties of the obtained variability models specific for our use case. Most of the features in both VAMs are mandatory. In fact, the challenge of our partners is not a customization of products, but, to maximize the common core to gain in terms of money and time during I&C systems certification.
Use Cases
Lessons Learned and Discussion
How to Introduce Variability Modeling to Nuclear Engineers? In the group, Inria and All4Tec are considered as variability experts. Though the concepts of similarities and variabilities were roughly understood by our partners, we first had to introduce them to variability and, more specifically variability modeling. The aim of this introduction is to lay the foundation of the concepts but also identify the boundaries of the discipline. We set up several half to full-day workshops to allow our industry partners to localize where there will be valuable variability to model, and elicit what they expect from the variability modeling. From these inputs, we had been able to propose a dedicated variability training performed by one of the author, to build the bridge between initial industrial assumptions and current product line engineering practices.
What is the Best Variability Modeling Paradigm Accordingly to the Domain Practices? We presented several di↵erent modeling paradigms, analysis capabilities, current limitations, etc. We discussed the choice of the modeling paradigm and the format of data that we will have to handle. Interestingly, CVL avoids the feature model (FM) terminology, while retaining FODA-like concrete syntax of FM. Since CVL is domain independent, it supports a broad range of types, including multiple instances, and a constraint language for expressing dependencies over these types. This terminology avoids the confusion caused by the ambiguous meaning of the term feature. Moreover, mapping to artifacts is a core objective of CVL and CVL stores the variability outside the base model, which allows the construction of an explicit common core for regulations.
How to Deal with the Search Space in Regulatory Corpora and What Is the Right Granularity Level for Modeling Requirements Variability? As mentioned earlier, nuclear domain is complex because of the variety of documents one has to handle, the number of requirements they contain, their high level of abstraction and ambiguity, etc. Following a naive method leads to variability models with fine granularity, verbose, and as a result, hard to understand and maintain by our industrial partners. To narrow this problem space, the first idea was to analyze variability in regulatory documents by topic on di↵erent corpora and on the same abstraction level. Thus, our industrial partners proposed to apply this approach on two standards and for di↵erent topics. Furthermore, using traceability matrix improves the understandability and the maintainability of variability models.
How to Address Requirements Variability on the Architecture? Modeling requirements variability is useful, however there is no direct mapping from requirements to the architecture. Therefore, we propose heading toward modeling variability in design rules since they act as a pivot between requirements and the architecture. Our partners rely on these rules to validate the architecture against safety requirements because they claim to satisfy one or several requirements. This idea allowed us to investigate the robustness of the architecture against regulatory requirements variability not considered by the product line and identify its impact on the architecture. Therefore, our industrial partners proposed a use case to implement our CVL approach for modeling variability in requirements and design rules and mapping them to the architecture.
RELATED WORK
Requirements and Variability Modeling. Goal oriented approaches like Tropos [3] , i* [24] , KAOS [22] or URN [10] have been used to address legal and regulatory requirements and their mapping to the system elements. However, though goal models explicitly describes influences on requirements, they lack of a concrete variability understanding. As stated by Siena et al. [20] , goals applied to laws and regulations are useful when the complexity of the statements is little enough to be reduced to goal relations.
Mining Variability. Alves et al. [1] , Niu et al. [15] , Weston et al. [23] and Chen et al. [4] applied information retrieval techniques to abstract requirements from existing specifications, typically expressed in natural language. Ferrari et al. [9] applied natural language processing techniques to mine commonalities and variabilities from brochures. Our industrial context exhibits characteristics that makes the problem of mining variability di cult. Topic overlaps, absence of an ontology, intrinsic heterogeneity and ambiguity. Consequently, we have introduced lightweight manual techniques to gradually support participants. The question to determine whether automated techniques can provide a reliable support to the consortium is still open.
Analyzing (Regulatory) Requirements Variabilities. Siena et al. proposed to address variability of law with Nómos 2 [20] . The proposed metamodel mainly aims to understand influences or margins within selected "norms" (text fragments from laws). Zhang et al. [25] propose "specialization, characterization, decomposition" links for their requirements refinements; "require, mutex, excludes" links for the constraints, as well as influence and interaction de-pendencies. Maxwell et al. [14] propose a taxonomy of crossreferences dedicated to the identification of conflicts between requirements. In both cases, the analysis remains manual and focused on selective and already defined sets of elements. One possible solution toward multiple jurisdictions can be to have the most constrained system possible. To this end, Gordon and Breaux [11] have developed a watermarking approach in order to determine the most constrained statement. Our goal is rather to capture all possible variations and keep flexibility.
CONCLUSION
With the renewal of the nuclear industry, the French nuclear energy industrials are aimed at selling and developing products outside France. A major challenge is the conformance of products to multiple di↵erent regulations, which introduce a necessary product line perspective.
In this paper, we proposed an approach to model variability in safety requirements and I&C architectural design. Our approach provides a variability-aware bridging of these two levels of abstraction in order to derive a complying architecture. We instantiated our approach on a realistic use case. Participants of the nuclear consortium can now map the variability of regulatory requirements onto architecture elements. We provided some lessons learned about the introduction of variability into this particular domain.
We are currently improving the di↵erent variability modeling tools, based on the Common Variability Language, of both parts -requirements and architecture -of the project. As future work, we aim to investigate the use of automated techniques to mine variability in regulatory requirements. We also plan to further exploit traceability links in order to reason about the conformance between regulatory requirements and the architecture of the CONNEXION project.
